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LETTER TO THE EDITOR Open Access
Nosocomial outbreak of multi-resistant
Streptococcus pneumoniae serotype 15A in
a centre for chronic pulmonary diseases
Guido J. H. Bastiaens1* , Amelieke J. H. Cremers1, Jordy P. M. Coolen1, Mayke T. Nillesen1, Martin J. Boeree2,
Joost Hopman1† and Heiman F. L. Wertheim1†
Abstract
We report nosocomial transmission of multi-resistant serotype 15A Streptococcus pneumoniae (MRSP) that resulted in
two lower respiratory tract infections in a centre for chronic pulmonary diseases. This outbreak highlights the potential
for transmission of MRSP among vulnerable patients when laboratory turnaround time is long and patient compliance
with transmission-based precautions is low.
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Main text
Streptococcus pneumoniae is a major cause of
community-acquired pneumonia, bacteraemia and men-
ingitis [1]. Asymptomatic nasopharyngeal colonization is
a predisposing factor for pneumococcal infection [2].
Infections arising in hospitalized patients are often
regarded as a result of earlier acquisition in the commu-
nity [2], although hospital outbreaks of susceptible and
resistant pneumococci have been reported [3–6]. Here, we
describe two risk factors for nosocomial transmission of
multi-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (MRSP) that
resulted in two cases of hospital-acquired pneumonia.
Patient A (index case) was admitted to the Radboud
University Medical Center Dekkerswald, a centre for
pulmonary rehabilitation, tuberculosis and lung diseases
(Groesbeek, The Netherlands) because of psychosocial is-
sues and a mild exacerbation of chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease (COPD) probably due to smoking. There
were no signs of infection. This patient had been a car-
rier of MRSP 3.5 years ago, but as MRSP had not been
identified in subsequent sputum cultures the patient was
regarded as MRSP negative. On day 9 after admission a
sputum sample collected on day 3 yielded S. pneumoniae
that was intermediately susceptible to penicillin and re-
sistant to erythromycin, tetracycline and clindamycin
(Fig. 1) indicating that patient A was an asymptomatic
carrier of MRSP again. Subsequently, the patient was
put on droplet and contact isolation according to proto-
col and discharged on day 17 (Fig. 1). Patient B was ad-
mitted to an adjacent room on the same day as patient
A because of an exacerbation of COPD. Patient B was
discharged after 6 days; readmitted three days later (on
day 10) with a hospital acquired pneumonia, and placed
on contact precautions on day 11 because of a rhino- or
enterovirus positive throat swab. On day 17 (day 7 after
second admission) S. pneumoniae with an antibiotic sus-
ceptibility pattern similar to that of patient A was iso-
lated from a sputum sample collected on admission.
Extension to droplet and contact isolation for MRSP
was, however, not installed. Patient B was discharged on
day 20. On day 27 patient C was admitted with an ex-
acerbation of COPD and that same day patient A
was readmitted with recommended isolation procedures
but the patient’s adherence to the instructions for
transmission-based precautions was poor. The patients
were placed in adjacent rooms. On day 32 patient C was
diagnosed with a hospital acquired pneumonia and S.
pneumoniae with an identical susceptibility profile to
that of patient A was isolated from patient C’s sputum,
three days later. Following isolation of MRSP, patient C
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was immediately put in adequate isolation and dis-
charged on day 40.
We suspected nosocomial transmission, since multiple
S. pneumoniae, isolated from one department, showed
identical but atypical colony morphology (non-mucoid,
small, greyish colonies) alongside unusual susceptibility
profiles (Fig. 1). In the Nijmegen area, between 2000 and
2017 not one invasive pneumococcal disease isolate had
displayed concurrent reduced susceptibility to β-lactams,
macrolides, lincosamides, and tetracyclines. Our suspicion
for relatedness was supported by their consistent serotype
15A that was assessed by Quellung reaction using
Pneumococcus Neufeld Antisera (Statens Serum Institut,
Copenhagen, Denmark) according to manufacturer’s in-
structions. To rule out further transmission, we screened
patients admitted to the same ward as the MRSP-positive
patients and healthcare workers (HCWs) who had contact
with them for carriage of MRSP using throat swabs. None
of the 14 inpatients, or 78 HCWs screened, carried MRSP,
and no further cases of MRSP arose. The importance of
hygiene precautions including hand hygiene was
re-emphasized. Since 2014 hand hygiene compliance is
monitored in Radboudumc Dekkerswald by direct
observations according to the 5 moments of the World
Health Organization [7]. At the time of the outbreak hand
hygiene compliance was 86–93%.
Nosocomial transmission of MRSP was confirmed by
whole-genome sequencing (WGS) on day 41 (Fig. 1)
showing that each of the outbreak isolates belonged to
the rare multi locus sequence type (MLST) 2105 and
carried the following antibiotic resistance genes: tetM
(resistance to tetracyclines) and ermB (resistance to
macrolides and lincosamides) [8]. Based on core single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis, all three
strains were highly similar and across their > 2 million
base pair long genome we detected only 4 SNPs
difference at most. Compared to 2 epidemiologically un-
related serotype 15A MLST-2105 pneumococcal isolates,
required for outbreak analysis given the large genetic
diversity within the S. pneumoniae species [9], the 3
outbreak strains clustered together (Fig. 1) and were, on
average, 137 SNPs different from the unrelated
MLST-2105 strains. This supports the hypothesis that
these cases arose from a common source.
The source of infection was presumably patient A.
Although community acquisition of this MRSP by
Fig. 1 a. Timeline of confirmed multi-resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae (MRSP) cases. Timeline of patients A, B and C in relation to their
admissions, discharges, MRSP positive cultures and infections. b. Core SNP-based phylogenetic tree of MLST-2105 serotype 15A strains showing 3
outbreak strains, 2 strains from patient A from 3.5 years ago, and 2 epidemiologically unrelated S. pneumoniae strains. Tree is rooted on midpoint.
Susceptibility for penicillin and ceftriaxone was determined by E-test and expressed as minimum inhibitory concentration (mg/L). For
erythromycin, clindamycin and tetracycline susceptibility was determined by disk diffusion and expressed as zone diameter (mm)
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patients B and C cannot be fully ruled out, multiple ar-
guments support nosocomial acquisition. The pneumo-
coccal strain concerned is rarely encountered worldwide
and is here proven to be communicable by WGS. Fur-
thermore, patients B and C have been directly exposed
to air droplets from patient A during regular chats, while
no common source or link outside the hospital could be
identified (patients were unrelated and living in different
areas). Possible transmission via HCWs was investigated,
yet no MRSP carriage could be identified among them,
and high hand hygiene compliance (directly related to
pneumococcal transmission [10]) suggested appropriate
attention for hygiene precautions. Transmission to
patient B probably occurred while patient A was not
immediately isolated due to time needed for bacterial
culture and susceptibility testing (Fig. 1). Patient C was
probably infected because patient A was not adhering to
droplet and contact precautions. WGS supported our
suspicion that patient A was the index case, whose
MRSP isolated 3.5 years ago showed 8 SNPs difference
from the current isolate, compared to 2 SNPs difference
between the isolates from the 3 patients involved in this
outbreak.
This outbreak highlights two risk factors for nosoco-
mial transmission of MRSP causing hospital-acquired
infections (patients B and C). First, time needed for
laboratory diagnosis in low-endemic regions may lead to
failure to timely install adequate transmission-based pre-
cautions. In this case the delay was due to the atypical
colony morphology and resistance pattern necessitating
confirmatory tests. Secondly, patient compliance with
transmission-based precautions may be low despite
standard instructions and may require day-to-day audits.
Considering the fact that patient A still turned out to be
a MRSP-carrier after 3.5 years and recent evidence
suggests that S. pneumoniae serotype and drug-resistance
are associated with carriage duration [11], additional
measures to prevent nosocomial spread in low-endemic
regions could include routine screening at admission for
patients who were colonized with MRSP previously, and
placing them on droplet and contact precautions until
carriage of MRSP has been ruled out.
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